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Talk given at UNC-Chapel Hill on November 17, 2000 (copyright S. G. Sterrett 2000 (copyright S. G. Sterrett , 2002 [ And, when reading the sections in the Tractatus about objects and states of affairs, or atomic facts, such as: [The timeline included as page 2 of the handout given out at the talk is shown on page 22 of this paper; it is a two-column chart entitled "Wittgenstein and Physical Similarity"]
Propositions as Pictures
To refresh your memory, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus was written early in "In a proposition a world is as it were put together experimentally. (As when in the law-court in Paris a motor-car accident is represented by means of dolls, etc.)" [Wittgenstein 1979, p. 7e] That insight, that in a proposition a world is put together experimentally, occurs in the context of considering the most general concept of the proposition, and of coordination between proposition and situation; an earlier entry on the very same day reads thus:
"The general concept of the proposition carries with it a quite general concept of the co-ordination of proposition and situation: The solution to all my questions must be extremely simple." [Wittgenstein 1979, p. 7e] His diary indicates that he thinks his insight about a world being put together experimentally does hold the solution to all his questions, for he then notes:
"This must yield the nature of truth straight away (if I were not blind)." [Wittgenstein 1979, p and (Summary) "that a certain thing is the case in the symbol says that a certain thing is the case in the world." That these ideas appear in his writings over a year before he made the notebook entry about the dolls in the law court indicates that the idea of a proposition as a picture may be a way to put certain thoughts he had already been formulating, rather than marking a totally unprecedented turn of thought.
Mental Models and Experimental Models
That Wittgenstein specifically mentions "experimentally" ("probeweise") in the key diary entry (" that in a proposition a world is put together experimentally") is more significant than might at first be obvious. 1988, p. 84] . In an essay on models, Boltzmann explicitly described experimental models as of a different sort than the kind with which he was comparing mental models. Boltzmann explains why they must be distinguished:
A distinction must be observed between the models which have been described and those experimental models which present on a small scale a machine that is subsequently to be completed on a larger, so as to afford a trial of its capabilities. Here it must be noted that a mere alteration in dimensions is often sufficient to cause a material alteration in the action, since the various capabilities depend in various ways on the linear dimensions.
Thus the weight varies as the cube of the linear dimensions, the surface of any single part and the phenomena that depend on such surfaces are proportionate to the square, while other effects ---such as friction, expansion and condition of heat, &c., vary according to other laws. Hence a flying-machine, which when made on a small scale is able to support its own weight, loses its power when its dimensions are increased. The theory, initiated by Sir Isaac Newton, of the dependence of various effects on the linear dimensions, is treated in the article UNITS, DIMENSIONS OF." [Boltzmann 1974, p. 220] Thus, for Boltzmann's account of mental models, the experimental models represent a In an important paper published in the Philosophical Transactions for 1883, he has given an account of an investigation, both theoretical and experimental, of the circumstances which determine whether the motion of water shall be direct or sinuous, or, in other words, regular and stable, or else eddying and unstable. The dimensions of the terms in the equations of motion of a fluid when viscosity is taken into account involve, as had been pointed out, the conditions of dynamical similarity in geometrically similar systems in which the motion is regular; but when the motion becomes eddying it seemed no longer to be amenable to mathematical treatment. But Professor Reynolds has shown that the same conditions of similarity hold good, as to the average effect, even when the motion is of the eddying kind; and moreover that if in one system the motion is on the border between steady and eddying, in another system it will also be on the border, provided the system satisfies the above conditions of dynamical as well as geometrical similarity. This is a matter of great practical importance, because the resistance to the flow of water in channels and conduits usually depends mainly on the formation of eddies; and though we cannot determine mathematically the actual resistance, yet the application of the above proposition leads to a formula for the flow, in which there is a most Mechanics. [Hertz 1956 [Hertz (1895 ] Basically, I show that the idea they find in Hertz --dynamical similarity --is an important one, but it is a ubiquitous idea found in any eighteenth century mechanics text of the time, that every single point they try to draw out of it can be found in any basic text on mechanics, and that physical similarity is a which is universal and capable of being generalized . . . [Buckingham 1915, p. 292 ] . . . any equation which describes completely a relation subsisting among a number of physical quantities of an equal or smaller number of different kinds, is reducible to the form ψ( π1, π2, π3, π4, etc. ) = 0 in which the π's are all the independent dimensionless products of the form Q1x, Q2y, . . ., etc. that can be made by using the symbols of all the quantities Q." [Buckingham 1914, p. 376 ] Notice that in this "most general form of a physical equation Buckingham " has struck the keynote of a new development of technical physics. . .
The importance of technical physics, as a branch of subject matter, is already so clearly recognized in Germany that laboratories are being established devoted exclusively to this field." [Buckingham 1915] Thus, although it is very hard to say just how much of this, and in what form, was around in Wittgenstein's milieu at various stages in his career, I think it is fair --actually quite a modest claim --to say that the practice of dimensional analysis, and of efforts to formalize it and generalize it, were part of the milieu of anyone studying aeronautics in the years just prior to 1914. And that is what Wittgenstein was doing then.
Manchester was famous for Osborne Reynolds's work in lending sophistication and respectability to the practice of scale modelling, and his striking and famous work on the onset of turbulence was done at Manchester. One of the earliest and most famous applications of physical similarity and scale modelling was the screw propeller, and
Wittgenstein was working on propellers. Another is the flow of jets through orifices, which Wittgenstein was working on in a laboratory. in which all the ''s are all the independent dimensionless products of the form Q1x, Q2y, . . ., etc. that can be made by using the symbols of all the quantities Q. [Buckingham 1914, p. 376 ] We don't know details about the specific scientific papers Wittgenstein read, but we do know that this was a major advance --to this day it is Buckingham's Summer of 1914
paper that is cited in English-language texts as the landmark paper that provides the formal mathematical basis for the method of scale models --that according to
Wittgenstein's own account, it was subsequently reading about the use of an experimental scale model in the Fall of 1914 --though in a courtroom!, rather than in a laboratory --that stimulated him to think of a proposition as a picture.
All right. That's the historical story. What difference does it make to the philosophy?
I promised that everything about objects, atomic facts, and propositions would fall into place once we understood this notion of model. That's all I'm going to claim: that a coherent reading falls out of this understanding, not that it's a good account of language. But I'll also hint at why I think it helps us see a thread between this early work and Wittgenstein's later work.
Let me return to the points in the Tractatus I mentioned early in the paper, and let's -that a picture must have its pictorial form in common with reality in order to able to depict it [TLP 2.17], I think it's clear that the reason it works is because it is also a piece of the world. The facts are the dimensionless ratios that are the same between the model and the situation being modelled, so depicting is having the same dimensionless ratios. It seems to me that the pictorial form would be having the same objects, i.e., the same quantities. So, in the screw propellor problem, it doesn't matter that we are using water in the model to picture a situation involving air, what does matter is that the relevant quantities are viscosity, temperature, velocity, and so on; something like that. that the what's important about the kind of quantity is how it combines with others to form dimensionless parameters. In the degenerate case, if an object combines with some other object to form a dimensionless parameter, then they are of the same kind.
He stays neutral as to which ones are basic or simple. This is consistent with a later entry in his notebook, in the context of puzzling over which objects are simple and which are not: he suddenly realizes this is not a question of which objects are absolutely simple: he exclaims: "The object is simple --for me!"
-that in a state of affairs, or atomic fact, objects fit into one another like links of a chain, and -that if all the objects are given, then all possible states of affairs, or atomic facts, are also given.
There's a huge literature on what people call "the picture theory" in the Tractatus --I mention here only one problem that some people think the most serious obstacle to making sense of it, and show it is no problem at all, but the most natural thing you'd want to say about picturing using models.
OK. Here's the supposed obstacle: If A can represent B and B can represent A, this is thought to be a problem for an interpretation of how A is a picture of B, for, the objection goes, how do you know which is reality and which is the picture? For people who think of Wittgenstein as proposing the picture theory to bridge a divide between two realms, one of which is reality and the other of which is some sort of representation of reality, this is supposed to be a knock-down argument for the dismissal of the whole lot of attempts to make sense of how propositions could be pictures. between his earlier and later work. Once he makes the notebook entry about the dolls in law-court, he never stops thinking about a proposition being a picture. It is in part in working out that idea all over again that the later work arises. In his later work, social and cultural aspects of language become more important than they seem to be in the Tractatus, but I suggest this: That he was first stirred to think about propositions this way by a context that involves social institutions, responsibility, blame and punishment shows us that his personal interest in logic was never something apart from such concerns. I can hardly think of a more culturally embedded, emotionally charged setting in which to think about "the general concept of the proposition" and "the coordination of proposition and situation" than a dispute about who was in the right legally in a traffic accident!
